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I. Introduction
The revival of long-distance trade in Europe, from the 10th through 14th centuries,
coincided with the expansion of urban areas, and the merchant guilds are often
viewed as having provided an institutional foundation for this `Commercial Revolu-
tion' (Lopez 1976).1 The guilds, which operated in commercial centers everywhere in
late medieval and early modern Europe, were organizations of merchants involved in
long-distance commerce and local wholesale trade, clearly distinguished by contem-
poraries from craft guilds and guilds of local retailers that organized the interests
of regional and local traders.2 The largest and most inﬂuential merchant guilds,
such as the German Hansa, participated in international commerce and politics and
established colonies in foreign cities.3,4 In many cases, the guilds evolved into or be-
came inextricably intertwined with the governments of their home towns. Merchant
guilds tended to be wealthier and of higher social status than craft guilds.5
Debate still rages about why the guilds existed and the economic impact they
exerted. As Gelderblom and Grafe (2010) point out, surprisingly little is known
about how merchant guilds originated or what they actually did, and the precise
role that they played in the expansion of trade during the Commercial Revolution
remains controversial. The `traditionalist' view is that the guilds were institutions
designed to enhance the market power of particular merchant groups. By control-
ling trade, the guilds increased the bargaining power of merchants with the rulers
of medieval cities, enabling them to shift some of the ﬁxed gains from trade from
rulers to merchants via the extraction of monopoly trading privileges and higher
1See Gelderblom (2013), `the history of European trade between 1000 and 1800 is a history of
urban competition'. Richardson (2008), Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994), Greif (2006, Ch. 4),
Gelderblom and Grafe (2010) and Kohn (2006) are modern exponents of the view that the guilds
supported and facilitated the expansion of international trade in this period.
2See Gelderblom and Grafe (2010) and Gelderblom (2013). Ogilvie (2011) provides a wealth of
information on both types of guild and emphasizes that most merchants only traded locally, hence
most guilds were also local. Merchant guilds (or `alien merchant guilds' in Ogilvie's nomenclature)
were often `colonies' of merchants trading in foreign cities who were all members of the same local
guild.
3The German Hansa (or `Hanseatic League', as it was known in England), originated with the
founding of Lubeck in 1159 and persisted roughly from the middle of the twelfth century until the
middle of the seventeenth century (Weiner, 1932, Dollinger, 1970, and Lloyd, 1991). Section V and
the appendix contain more detailed descriptions of the Hansa.
4According to Kohn (2003), alien merchants ﬁrst established colonies in the early 12th century
in the East-such as Acre, Antioch, Alexandria, and Constantinople-and soon after that in Rome,
Naples, and Palermo. But by the end of the 13th century, colonies of alien merchants were to be
found in cities throughout Europe. See also Coornaert (1967).
5See Richardson (2008). According to Kohn (2003), the `guilds were entirely an urban phe-
nomenon, and they usually had a close connection with city government. In northern Europe,
where cities were initially subject to local rulers, merchant guilds provided a form of governance
and representation for those involved in commerce.'
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rents.6 More recently, a variety of authors have argued that merchant guilds were
eﬃciency-enhancing institutions solving one or another of the incentives problems
which beset early medieval trade, such as commercial insecurity, contract enforce-
ment, social capital formation and information exchange.7 A more general version of
this view regards guilds as social networks that generated beneﬁcial social capital by
sustaining shared norms, punishing violators of these norms, eﬀectively transmitting
information and successfully undertaking collective action.8
Gelderblom and Grafe (2010), for example, argue that the guilds helped long-
distance traders solve two fundamental problems of exchange: protection against
crime, warfare and arbitrary conﬁscation on the one hand, and the enforcement of
contracts on the other.9 And in a much-cited article, Greif, Milgrom and Weingast
(1994) argued that the guilds arose in response to the commercial insecurity of
European merchants trading in foreign countries10, a view presaged earlier by De
Roover (1965) and others (see Ogilvie 2011, pp. 193-5). According to this thesis,
individual merchants engaging in long-distance trade faced high risks resulting from
general commercial insecurity and arbitrary conﬁscations by medieval city rulers.
Before a trading center was established, a city's rulers could promise to protect
the rights of foreign merchants, but once trade had commenced, the rulers faced the
temptation to renege on this pledge, by failing to provide the promised protection or
by using their coercive power to conﬁscate merchants' property.11 Without a credible
commitment by the rulers of a trading center to provide a secure environment, alien
merchants would have been deterred from trading there  an outcome that was
ineﬃcient for both the cities and the merchants. Reducing commercial insecurity
and enhancing opportunities for expanding trade meant that the cities and the
merchants needed a means to overcome the medieval cities' `commitment problem'.
A key role of the merchant guilds, according to Greif, Milgrom and Weingast, was
to coordinate merchants' responses to cheating by city rulers, by enforcing trade
6Thrupp (1965) and North and Thomas (1973) provide the standard treatment of the guilds as
cartels. Hickson and Thompson (1991) thoroughly review and critique the monopoly view of the
guilds. Dessi and Ogilvie (2004) provide a more recent review of the historical literature.
7See Ogilvie (2011), Ch.1.
8Dasgupta (2000) refers to merchant guilds as social networks whose social capital facilitated
commercial growth in Europe.
9Also Gelderblom (2013) who argues that `the growth of European trade depended on the eﬀorts
of individual cities to protect merchants...because they expected to gain from trade'. See also Hickson
and Thompson (1991).
10See also Greif (2006), Ch. 4.
11According to Kohn (2003), merchants in this period were subject to two types of predation.
The ﬁrst was the forcible seizure of property and persons; the second was the exaction of payment
under threat of forcible seizure - tolls, taxes, ﬁnes, and the `royal prise'. Much of the forcible
seizure was either carried out by city governments or authorized by them.
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embargoes against cities which failed to protect merchants' property rights. The
guilds thus allowed mutually beneﬁcial trade to occur at higher levels than would
have otherwise been possible.12
More recently still, Ogilvie (2011) has devoted an entire book to refuting these
claims. She argues that all of the eﬃciency interpretations of guilds are fanciful,
and forcefully reasserts the view that the merchant guilds were eﬃciency-reducing
monopolies which existed and survived for so long because they served the mutual
interests of powerful merchants and city rulers, providing a mechanism whereby
merchants and rulers could collaborate to extract more resources for themselves
at the expense of the rest of the economy. `Merchant guilds existed in so many
economies for such a long time' she argues, `not because they were eﬃcient in solving
commercial problems in ways that beneﬁted everyone, but because they were eﬀective
in enabling inﬂuential social groups to transfer resources to their own members, at
the expense of society as a whole'.
Whatever their interpretation of the function and role of the guilds13, however,
all authors emphasize the fundamental importance of the guilds' economic power,
speciﬁcally to launch and sustain trade embargoes against recalcitrant city rulers
which failed to protect their rights and privileges. This power in turn depended upon
the coercive power of guilds to enforce the participation of individual merchants in
trade embargoes, typically via the threat of expulsion, when it may not have been
in their individual interests to do so.
Ogilvie (2011, p. 83) observes that everywhere in Europe merchant guilds in-
vested in systems to detect and penalize guild members who violated cartel rules
and policies (see also Ogilvie 2011, p. 139). Gelderblom and Grafe (2010) suggest
that the ability of a mercantile organization to prevent `free-riding' by being able
to exclude members for violating guild policies `was an important and distinctive
development in the organization of the guilds'. Sachs (2006) tells us that `boycotts
could be maintained by punishing guild members who violated the rules of the cartel',
citing the ostracism in 1281 of Jakemin of Liège from the guild of Leicester (although
12As Grief et al. summarize their argument: `It is our thesis that merchant guilds emerged with
the encouragement of the rulers of trading centers to be a countervailing power, enhancing the
ruler's ability to commit to the security of alien merchants, and laying an important institutional
foundation for the growing trade of that period.'
13We do not enter into this historical controversy in this paper, but note that the thesis that the
guilds were primarily concerned with extracting and maintaining monopoly trading privileges is not
entirely inconsistent with the view that their activities may also have permitted trade to expand
beyond levels which otherwise would have occurred. Greif (2006, p. 94) for example argues that,
`viewing merchant guilds as supporting trade is complementary to the more common view among
economic historians that they emerged to reduce negotiation costs, administer trade and taxation,
extract privileges from foreign cities, and redistribute rents in their own cities.' Ogilvie (2011)
rejects all such claims, however.
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not for failing to participate in a trade embargo in this instance). And Kohn (2003,
p.13) is very explicit on this score:
`To be eﬀective, an embargo had to be total: all the members of the
association had to participate. This was a problem, because an individual
member could do better for himself by ignoring the embargo, even though
this undermined the position of the group as a whole. So it was important
that a merchant association was able to impose discipline on its members:
an eﬀective system of internal order was indispensable.'
Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994) (also Grief 2006, Ch. 4) also rely entirely on
the power of the guilds to enforce compliance to trade embargoes to explain their
ability to sustain more eﬃcient levels of trade. They argue that neither bilateral rep-
utation mechanisms (in which a merchant whose rights were abused ceases trading),
nor `informal' multilateral reputation mechanisms (in which the cheated merchant
and his close associates cease trading) would have been suﬃcient to overcome me-
dieval cities' commitment problem, creating the need for an institution which could
coordinate the responses of a large fraction of merchants to oﬀenses against mer-
chant property, and enforce them by imposing sanctions on individual merchants.
Eﬃcient trade would not have been possible if the guilds lacked the ability to enforce
compliance to trade embargoes (for example, by expelling merchants who refused
to comply with trade boycotts), as credible incentives for `embargo breaking' would
have rendered the guilds powerless.14
Our purpose in this paper is to provide a diﬀerent characterization of how the
guilds overcame a medieval city's incentives to cheat foreign merchants, or the `com-
mitment problem', which does not rely on the coercive power of guilds to enforce
the participation of individual merchants in trade embargoes. Using a more gen-
eral model than that of Grief et al., we show that sustaining more eﬃcient levels
of trade implied an ability on the part of the guilds to restrict their membership
and to condition their punishment strategies accordingly (i.e. by only threatening
trade embargoes when guild members rights were violated), but that no internal
enforcement mechanism was necessary. Our formulation of the guilds' equilibrium
strategies  based on an extensive review of the historical evidence  makes the
threat to impose a trade boycott self-enforcing in the absence of other enforcement
mechanisms, thus resolving the credibility issue and allowing higher levels of trade
to be achieved.
14As Greif, Milgrom and Weingast put it, `to support the eﬃcient level of trade, a multilateral
reputation mechanism may need to be supplemented by an organization with the ability both to
coordinate embargo decisions and enforce them, by applying sanctions on its own members'.
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This matters because the ultimate sanction a guild could impose on its mem-
bers was expulsion, or exclusion, from the guild and its trading privileges.15 This
sanction is unlikely to have been eﬀective against embargo breaking, however, and
presumably for this reason was rarely, if ever, used for such purposes. While Greif,
Milgrom and Weingast (1994) attribute much of the success of the German Hansa
to its increased ability, after 1307, to enforce trade boycotts by making use of the
threat of expulsion, the historical evidence does not support their thesis.16 Although
the Hansa used the economic weapon of the trade embargo successfully, and repeat-
edly, from the thirteenth to ﬁfteenth centuries in numerous countries, it is clear from
Dollinger's (1970) account that German towns only participated in these when it
was in their self-interest to do so and the threat of sanctions and exclusion, although
present, was almost never used. The unique case of the expulsion of Bremen in 1284
(for refusing to support a trade embargo against Norway), which is described in
Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994, p. 760) as a `milestone' in Hansa organization,
more accurately illustrated the limited power of this threat, as Bremen's merchants
traded successfully outside of the Hansa for the subsequent 74 years.17 As Dollinger
(1970, pp. 108-109) observed, exclusion was a `two-edged weapon' since excluded
merchants could carry on trading outside of the guild, at the expense of guild mem-
bers. Examples of exclusion or expulsion of individual merchants for refusing to
participate in trade embargoes are also essentially absent from the historical litera-
ture.18
The key insight of our analysis is that the guilds' universal practice of demanding
compensation from city rulers when their rights were violated changed the incentives
of city rulers and hence of individual guild members, making participation in trade
embargoes individually advantageous, and thus self enforcing, for merchants (i.e. a
Nash equilibrium). While earlier analyses have concentrated on the eﬀectiveness
of trade embargoes to obtain protection and negotiate trading privileges for the
merchant guilds, the historical evidence makes clear that this threat was only used
when cities refused to pay compensation to merchants whose property rights had
been violated. The resumption of trade after an embargo had been implemented
15Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994, p.757) and Greif (2006, p.104) state the traditional view
that the guilds' ultimate sanction against individual merchants was exclusion from their monopoly
trading privileges and rents. See also Gelderblom and Grafe (2010) for a strong restatement of this
view.
16As we show in Section V below.
17Dollinger (1970, p. 66-67).
18Recall the case cited by Sachs (2006) mentioned immediately above which did not concern a
trade embargo. In Section V below and in the appendix we describe the historical evidence on this
score in more detail, particularly noting the largely unsuccessful attempts of the German Hansa
to use the threat of exclusion to impose discipline on Hansa towns.
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also typically depended upon merchants ﬁrst being indemniﬁed for past losses.19
We reformulate the guilds' equilibrium strategies to include a demand for com-
pensation, and show that this can make the threat to impose a trade boycott self-
enforcing for individual merchants. We thus resolve the enforcement problem and
show how the guilds could credibly threaten to impose trade embargoes via their
ability to `curtail a city ruler's ability to undermine an embargo by oﬀering special
terms to violators' (Greif, Milgrom and Weingast, 1994, p. 757). The guilds did
not need the power to coerce individual merchants to take part in the punishment
of cities, since they could rely on their private equilibrium incentives to do so.
It is worth noting that the expectation of the payment of compensation by cities
is not the reason that individual merchants' incentives are more closely aligned with
those of the guild under the equilibrium strategies posited in this paper. Compen-
sation was typically only paid to guild members whose rights had been violated, or
goods robbed or conﬁscated. Hence most merchants would not have expected to
receive any payment for participating in trade boycotts. Rather, the demand for
compensation made it in the cities' interest to cheat embargo breakers and resume
trade with the guild at the ﬁrst opportunity, whenever an embargo was called. This
made oﬀering to trade during embargoes unproﬁtable for individual merchants and
hence participation in trade boycotts in their individual interest.
Our theory of how the guilds' overcame the enforcement problem is ﬁrmly based
in the historical literature and allows us to provide a richer picture of how the guilds
may have facilitated trade expansion by controlling merchant trading activities. It
does not tell us, however, whether merchants and the cities would have agreed on the
level of trade that they wished to support. If the guilds had the power to restrict the
equilibrium volume of trade, they would likely have wished to impose a sub-optimal
level of trade from the cities' point of view. The same ability to restrict trade
could also have been used to negotiate favorable tax treatment for guild members in
return for an agreement to expand trade towards levels preferred by city rulers level,
however. As such, our reformulation can be seen as at least partially reconciling the
two opposing views of the function of the guilds discussed above.
In the remainder of this paper we provide a new formulation of the theory of
guilds to address these issues. Section II describes the model. Section III explains
how compensation payments could credibly sustain trade via bilateral punishment
strategies. Section IV analyses the introduction of demand for compensation into
the guilds' equilibrium strategies, and we demonstrate that these would have been
suﬃcient to sustain eﬃcient trade even in the absence of formal enforcement mech-
19We provide the historical evidence for these claims in Section V below.
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anisms, or sanctions, to deter embargo breaking. Section V discusses some of the
relevant historical evidence. Section VI discusses what levels of trade may actually
have been achieved and Section VII concludes.
II. A Formal Model
We begin by specifying an inﬁnite horizon repeated-game model of trade between
merchants and a city. In a given period, if the number of merchants is m > 0 the
gross value of trade is given by the function v (m). The city's costs of providing
protection to merchants is given by the function c (m) , where c (m) can depend
on the number of merchants m or the value of trade v (m). We assume that both
v and c are non negative and continuously diﬀerentiable over the relevant range,
that c is convex and that v (0) = c (0) = 0. We also assume that the net value of
trade v (m)− c (m) is concave, positive somewhere and achieves a unique maximum
at m∗, which we denote as the `eﬃcient' level of trade, deﬁned by the condition
v′ (m∗) = c′ (m∗) .
Medieval cities beneﬁted from trade in a variety of ways, including by selling
monopoly rights and directly taxing merchants.20 We denote the city's beneﬁt func-
tion by τ(m), which can depend on the number of merchants m or the value of
trade v(m). We assume that τ (m) is non negative and continuously diﬀerentiable
and that τ (0) = 0. We also assume that the city extracts only part of the gross
value of trade, speciﬁcally that τ (m) < v (m) and τ ′ (m) < v′ (m) for all relevant m.
The city's payoﬀ from protecting m traders is thus τ(m)− c(m), which we assume
to be concave and positive for relevant m and achieve a unique maximum at mC ,
the city's preferred level of trade, deﬁned by the condition τ ′
(
mC
)
= c′
(
mC
)
. Note
that by the assumption that τ ′ (m) < v′ (m), the city's preferred level of trade is
less than the optimal, i.e. mC < m∗ . If the city fails to protect a fraction 0 <  ≤ 1
of merchants, its net payoﬀ is τ (m) − c ((1− )m) . The city may oﬀer to pay a
compensation k (m) to the m merchants whom it failed to protect in the past.
An individual merchant's payoﬀ when protected by the city is 1
m
(v (m)− τ (m)).
Merchants who are not protected collect no revenues and so earn − 1
m
τ (m).21 Mer-
20According to Gelderblom (2008), medieval cities beneﬁted from long-distance trade in numer-
ous ways: (i) by directly levying monopoly fees or customs duties, or through excises on consumer
goods or impositions on the income and wealth of merchants; (ii) the mercantile community was
a principle source of credit for city rulers; (iii) as suppliers of ships, weapons and ammunition;
and (iv) early modern rulers attached great value to the role of trade in supplementing the state's
stock of gold and silver. In return, merchants expected the government to protect their person and
goods against theft and robbery, and to refrain from arbitrary conﬁscation and imprisonment.
21The natural interpretation is that unprotected merchants suﬀer losses post trade, i.e. after the
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chants who are compensated receive an additional payoﬀ of 1
m
k (m).
Each player  the city and the merchants  discounts future payoﬀs at rate
δ ∈ (0, 1). We deﬁne γ = δ
1−δ to be the present value of an inﬁnite annuity of 1 with
payment starting in the next period.
We consider subgame perfect equilibria of this game. We restrict attention to
equilibria in which the city deals with the same group of m merchants over time and
compensation plays an active part in the strategies. In particular, at equilibrium
the m merchants oﬀer to trade in each period until cheated, and then to refuse
to trade further until the compensation 1
m
k (m) is paid to them (other merchants
do not oﬀer to trade). Furthermore, the city provides protection to the m trading
merchants (and leave all other merchants unprotected), and, if the city has failed to
protect a fraction  of the m merchants in any period, pay the compensation k (m)
to them at the ﬁrst opportunity (and never pay compensation to other merchants).
III. Compensation To Support Bilateral Punishment
We ﬁrst consider the case in which merchants' responses to being cheated or un-
protected by the city are uncoordinated. Then neither the eﬃcient, nor the city's
preferred, level of trade can be supported as repeated game equilibria.
Proposition 1. Deﬁne m̂ to be the largestm such that δτ ′ (m) ≥ c′ (m). Then, when
merchants behave independently, trade with at most m̂ merchants can be sustained
at equilibrium, where m̂ < mC < m∗.
In any equilibrium, if the city cheats a fraction  of merchants in some period
t and pays the compensation k (m) at the ﬁrst opportunity (i.e. in period t + 1),
trade at m is resumed immediately, while if the city refuses to pay compensation
it trades with the remaining (1− )m merchants.22The city's payoﬀ from cheating
and then refusing to pay compensation indeﬁnitely is
τ (m)− c ((1− )m) + γ (τ ((1− )m)− c ((1− )m)) , (0.1)
whereas if it pays the compensation k (m) in period t + 1 and behaves honestly
value of trade v(m) has been realized, rather than pre trade.
22We envisage the following order of moves in any period: ﬁrst, the city has the opportunity to
pay compensation to any merchant it has cheated in the past; second, merchants decide whether
or not to trade; third, the city decides whether to cheat any of the current traders; and ﬁnally,
payoﬀs are realized.
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thereafter it receives
τ (m)− c ((1− )m)− δk (m) + γ (τ (m)− c(m)) . (0.2)
Hence a necessary condition for compensation to be paid in period t+ 1 is
δk (m) ≤ γ [(τ (m)− τ ((1− )m))− (c (m)− c ((1− )m))]

. (0.3)
For the city to prefer playing the honest strategy in period t over cheating a fraction
 of merchants and then paying compensation k (m) in period t+ 1 requires
(1 + γ) (τ (m)− c (m)) ≥ τ (m)− c ((1− )m)−δk (m)+γ (τ (m)− c (m)) , (0.4)
which yields
δk (m) ≥ c (m)− c ((1− )m)

(0.5)
We thus have
c (m)− c ((1− )m)

≤ δk(m) ≤ γ [(τ (m)− τ ((1− )m))− (c (m)− c ((1− )m))]

,
(0.6)
and taking limits (i.e. letting → 0),
(1 + γ)c′ (m) ≤ γτ ′ (m) , (0.7)
or
δτ ′ (m) ≥ c′ (m) . (0.8)
Finally, from δτ ′ (m∗) < δv′ (m∗) < v′ (m∗) = c′ (m∗) and δτ ′
(
mC
)
< τ ′
(
mC
)
=
c′
(
mC
)
, as well as the convexity of c and the concavity of τ − c, it follows that
m̂ < mC < m∗.
Note that the limit on trade, m̂, that may be achieved when merchants behave
independently is the same as that in the model of Greif, Milgrom and Weingast
(1994), that is the condition deﬁning m̂ is the same. This condition says that, at
the margin (i.e. for a single merchant), the loss of future tax revenue must exceed
the cost saving from not protecting merchants and this trade-oﬀ is present in both
models. The nature of the equilibria are diﬀerent, however. Here compensation
ensures that equilibrium is renegotiation proof, in that merchants are unwilling to
renegotiate and resume trade immediately after being cheated because they expect
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to be paid compensation.23,24 In other words, compensation credibly sustains pun-
ishment strategies for failing to protect trade. In particular, we have the following
result:
Proposition 2. Suppose that (0.3) and (0.5) are satisﬁed for all m ≤ m̂ and 0 <
 ≤ 1. Then trade with m ≤ m̂ merchants may be sustained as an equilibrium if
τ (m) ≥ (1− δ) v (m) + δc (m).
From the argument above, we already know that the city's strategy is a best re-
sponse to merchants' strategies. Consider next the merchants' incentives. A cheated
merchant's demand that the city pay compensation is credible if: (i) the merchant
expects to receive the compensation in period t+n if it was refused in period t+n−1;
and (ii) refusing to renegotiate (i.e. by returning to the level of trade m without
ﬁrst receiving compensation) is preferable to renegotiation. The ﬁrst condition re-
quires that in any period t + n, n = 1, 2,..., the city prefers to pay compensation
immediately rather than waiting one period, which is guaranteed by the condition
(0.3). The second condition requires that merchants who have been cheated prefer
to wait to obtain compensation over renegotiation, i.e.
δk (m) + γ (v (m)− τ (m)) ≥ (1 + γ) (v (m)− τ (m)) , (0.9)
or
δk (m) ≥ v (m)− τ (m) . (0.10)
Combining with (0.3), we require
v (m)− τ (m) ≤ γ (τ (m)− c (m)) , (0.11)
or
τ (m) ≥ (1− δ) v (m) + δc (m) . (0.12)
23We are following Farrell's (2000) deﬁnition of a `quasi-symmetrically weakly renegotiation-
proof equilibrium' here.
24In the absence of compensation payments the posited bilateral punishment strategies would
not be credible. Why should merchants refuse to trade with a city which has cheated them in the
past when mutually proﬁtable trade is possible on terms which the city would credibly respect?
Suppose, for example, that a subgame is reached in which the city has cheatedm−n of traders, with
n < m̂. Then a merchant who was cheated in the past will know that the city's incentives, under
the speciﬁed strategies, is not to cheat on additional trade agreements until n = m̂. The speciﬁed
strategies are not renegotiation-proof, as both merchants and the city will, in some subgames,
prefer to return to the equilibrium path of play rather than carry out the required punishments.
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IV. Compensation To Support Embargoes
In the preceding section compensation payments were used to credibly sustain trade
via bilateral punishment strategies, i.e. punishment strategies in which only traders
who have been cheated refuse to trade until compensation has been paid. But de-
mands for compensation can also be used to sustain higher levels of trade, by making
a merchant guild's threat to impose a trade boycott self-enforcing for individual mer-
chants. They thus resolve the enforcement problem noted by Greif, Milgrom and
Weingast (1994).
To demonstrate this, we consider a guild withm members and specify the fol-
lowing strategies in any trading period. The guild's strategy is to announce a trade
boycott until the compensationk(m) has been paid if the city ever cheats a fraction
 of guild members, with 0 <  ≤ 1. Merchants who are guild members oﬀer to
trade if and only if no boycott has been announced by the guild. Merchants who
are not guild members do not oﬀer to trade with the city. The city's strategy is: (i)
to protect trade withm guild members unless a boycott has been announced by the
guild; (ii) to cheat any merchant who oﬀers to trade that is not a guild member;
(iii) if a boycott is announced by the guild at the end of period t, pay the demanded
compensation k(m)at the ﬁrst opportunity (i.e. the beginning of period t+1); and
(iv) cheat any merchant that oﬀers to trade during a boycott before compensation
has been paid.25 We then have the following result:
Proposition 3. Assume δ (τ (m)− τ (m̂)) ≥ c (m) − c (m̂) for all m ∈ (m̂,m∗].
Then any level of trade m ∈ (m̂,m∗] can be sustained by the strategies described
above and a compensation payment of δk (m) = c (m).
In the previous section, we saw that the city prefers playing honestly over cheat-
ing a fraction  of traders and paying compensation k at the ﬁrst opportunity if
the condition (0.5) is satisﬁed. For the city to prefer paying compensation k at the
ﬁrst opportunity when a boycott has been announced, to facing an indeﬁnite trade
embargo requires
−δk (m) + γ (τ (m)− c (m)) ≥ 0, (0.13)
25That is, we assume the following order of moves in any period t. If no boycott is in force at
the beginning of period t: ﬁrst, individual merchants decide whether to oﬀer to trade; second,
the city decides whether to cheat any of the current traders; third, the guild decides whether to
announce a trade boycott; and ﬁnally, payoﬀs are realized. If a boycott is in force at the
beginning of period t: ﬁrst, the city has the opportunity to pay the compensation demanded by
the guild; second, the guild decides whether to discontinue the boycott; third individual merchants
decide whether to oﬀer to trade; fourth, the city decides whether to cheat any of the current traders;
ﬁfth, the guild decides whether to announce a trade boycott; and ﬁnally, payoﬀs are realized.
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or
δk (m) ≤ γ (τ (m)− c (m)) , (0.14)
for all 0 <  ≤ 1. These two conditions together require
(1 + γ) c (m) ≤ γτ (m) , (0.15)
or
δτ (m) ≥ c (m) . (0.16)
Clearly guild members will wish to oﬀer to trade under these circumstances. Non-
guild members will not oﬀer to trade under a bilateral trade agreement, however,
since the city's `threat' to cheat them is credible when m > m̂ (remember that m̂ is
the highest level of trade that can be supported by bilateral punishment strategies).
Thus trade at m can be sustained by these strategies so long as the guild's threat to
impose a trade boycott when compensation is not paid is credible, i.e. not subject
to embargo breaking by individual merchants.
For a boycott to be credible in this sense, we need to show that individual
merchants will not proﬁt from breaking a guild-imposed trade embargo, because
they expect the city to cheat them. That is, we need to show that the city will prefer
to follow its equilibrium strategy of paying compensation over reverting to bilateral
trade agreements with embargo breakers.26 We adopt the natural assumption that
the guild does not protect embargo breakers by imposing a further trade boycott
when they are cheated by the city.27
Three types of embargo breaking can be considered. First, embargo breaking
by individual merchants who do not coordinate their trading strategies; second,
embargo breaking by `coalitions' of individual merchants who coordinate on their
oﬀers to trade, but not on their punishment strategies; and ﬁnally, embargo breaking
by alternative guilds. To keep things simple, it is easiest to think of the set of non-
guild merchants as being `large' relative to the size of the original guild, so that
26In other words, we need to resolve the conundrum pointed out by Greif, Milgrom and Weingast
(1994) in their model without compensation, that the speciﬁed strategies lack credibility in that
`the expectations and behavior that they entail seem implausible'. Why should the city cheat all
merchants who oﬀer to trade during a trade embargo when `mutually proﬁtable trade is possible
on terms which the city would credibly respect', that is, when mutually proﬁtable bilateral trade
agreements between the city and individual merchants (`embargo breakers') may be reached up
to the level m̂. Similarly, why should merchants (i.e. embargo breakers) refuse to trade with
a city which has cheated others in the past? In the literature on renegotiation-proofness, similar
criticisms have been leveled at the equilibria of other repeated game models, see e.g. Bernheim and
Ray (1989) and Farrell and Maskin (1989), and more recently by sociobiologists, e.g. McElreath
and Boyd (2007) and Gintis (2004).
27As Kohn (2003) notes, a guild `provided its members with protection against predation', and
ignoring a trade embargo meant `becoming an outlaw, with no such protection'.
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coalitions of any size can form.
Given that the guild has announced a boycott, an oﬀer of a bilateral trade
agreement by an individual merchant is of no value to the city, since v(0) = 0. If,
on the other hand, the city pays the compensation k demanded by the guild at the
next opportunity and resumes trade at m, its payoﬀ is given by (0.13).28 Assuming
that (0.14) is satisﬁed, the city is better oﬀ cheating any such merchant and paying
the required compensation. Therefore, when (0.15) is satisﬁed, a compensation level
δk ≤ γ (τ (m)− c (m)) is suﬃcient to ensure that the city will always prefer to cheat
an individual embargo breaker and return to the equilibrium level of trade m. This
is suﬃcient to deter embargo breaking because individual merchants expect every
other merchant to follow the equilibrium strategy, and not oﬀer to trade. Incentives
for embargo breaking are alleviated, and any volume of trade m̂ ≤ m ≤ m∗ can be
supported as an equilibrium.29
A stronger condition on the equilibrium strategies would require that they be
immune to `renegotiation' by coalitions of individual embargo breakers and the city.
We assume that the embargo breakers do not form an alternative guild, however,
i.e. they do not coordinate their strategies in response to cheating by the city. So
the maximum size of an embargo-breaking coalition is m̂ as deﬁned above, since
this is the maximum volume of trade that be sustained by purely bilateral trade
agreements.
To see that the level of trade m can still be supported as an equilibrium, assume
there are m˜ ≤ m̂ embargo breakers, i.e. merchants who collectively oﬀer to trade
under bilateral trade agreements with the city during a boycott. For the city to
prefer to cheat them, pay the compensation k demanded by the guild, and then
resume trade at m requires
τv (m˜)− δk + γ (τ (m)− c (m)) ≥ (1 + γ) (τ (m˜)− c (m˜)) , (0.17)
or
δk ≤ (1 + γ) c (m˜)− γτ (m˜) + γ (τ (m)− c (m)) . (0.18)
Under condition (0.7), the right-hand side of (0.18) is minimized for m˜ = m̂.
28That is, we are considering the subgame in which in period t, the city has cheated in some
period t−n, n ≥ 1, has not yet oﬀered to pay compensation, and receives an oﬀer to trade from an
individual merchant. It is only necessary to consider individual oﬀers of embargo breaking because
each merchant expects all other merchants to adhere to their equilibrium strategies. But see below.
29If the guild attempted to enforce a volume of tradem less than m̂, the part of the city's strategy
which calls on it to cheat any merchant who is not a guild member would not be sustainable, since
it can credibly and proﬁtably enter into bilateral trade agreements with a further m̂−m traders.
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Combining (0.5) and (0.18) we thus have the condition
c (m) ≤ δk ≤ γ (τ (m)− c (m))− [γτ (m̂)− (1 + γ) c (m̂)] , (0.19)
implying
(1 + γ) (c (m)− c (m̂)) ≤ γ (τ (m)− τ (m̂)) , (0.20)
or
δ (τ (m)− τ (m̂)) ≥ c (m)− c (m̂) . (0.21)
The above condition can only be satisﬁed if the additional value of trade to
the city τ (m) − τ (m̂) increases rapidly enough above m̂ to oﬀset the increase in
protection costs c (m) − c (m̂) , so that the city's losses from reducing the value of
trade to m̂ by trading with embargo breakers are large enough. Otherwise, the city
would prefer to cheat guild members and revert to trading under bilateral trading
agreements at m̂.30 The condition will always be satisﬁed if protection costs are
constant (i.e. independent of the number of traders or the value of trade, as some
authors suggest), or proportional to the value of trade as assumed in Greif, Milgrom
and Weingast (1994)31
Finally, what if alternative guilds can form and oﬀer to trade under the strategies
speciﬁed above after a boycott has been announced? Under condition (0.15), it is
easy to see from the immediately preceding argument that the original guild must
then contain exactly mC members. Otherwise, an alternative guild containing mC
members can form during a boycott and replace the original guild by oﬀering to trade
at the city's preferred level. Competition between alternative guilds thus restricts
the levels of trade which any particular guild can implement.
V. Sustaining Equilibrium Trade: Trade Embargoes
And Compensation
We have shown that sustaining more eﬃcient trade implied an ability on the part of
the guilds to restrict their membership, and to condition their punishment strategies
30It is worth observing, however, that assuming that there are m̂ embargo breakers is the worst
possible case for the guild, and the necessary condition is signiﬁcantly relaxed as the number of
embargo breakers is reduced.
31Greif, Milgrom and Weingast assumed that the city's protection costs were equal to c · v(m)
and its beneﬁts from trade equal to τ · v(m) , with 0 < c < τ < 1. Under these assumptions
condition (29) is always satisﬁed, for any level of trade, from condition (??) (which corresponds to
condition (4) in Greif, Milgrom and Weingast). Our model thus entirely resolves the enforcement
problem, and hence the "commitment problem", in the special case considered by Greif, Milgrom
and Weingast
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accordingly (i.e. by only threatening trade embargoes when guild members rights
were violated), but that no internal enforcement mechanism was necessary. By
including a demand for compensation in their equilibrium strategies, the guilds
would have been able to resolve the enforcement problem, and hence `commitment
problem' noted in Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994), by making trade embargoes
(or multilateral punishments) self-enforcing. They would thus have been able to
support trade at higher levels than otherwise, even in the absence of an internal
enforcement mechanism to punish `embargo breakers'.32
Our analysis is based on two important assumptions. First, we assume that
medieval cities could elicit trade from speciﬁed subgroups of traders, and could
condition their strategies accordingly. That is, cities could oﬀer protection to just
those merchants in a speciﬁed subgroup, and leave all other merchants unprotected.
This assumption is in accord with the historical evidence. It was not unusual for
the rulers of medieval cities to guarantee safe passage to particular merchants, or
groups of merchants, traveling through their territories for trade. Gelderblom (2005)
details many such instances,33 and Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994, p. 752) note
that `in medieval trade ... a city could discriminate among merchants, abusing or
not protecting them selectively'.34 Gelderblom and Grafe (2010), noting the ability
of the English Company of Merchant Adventurers in Antwerp and Middelburg to
exclude merchants from participation in the cloth trade, suggest that `the ability of
a mercantile organization to prevent free-riding, and reserve the economic beneﬁts
of its operations to the membership' was an important and distinctive development
in the organization of the guilds.35 Finally, Ogilvie (2011, pp. 214-215) points
out that merchant guild trade embargoes were never aimed at enhancing general
security for commerce, but rather to expand the privileges of the members of that
particular guild, which included privileges related to security as well as other issues
(e.g. taxes).
Second, we resolve the `credibility' issues raised above (i.e. renegotiation-proofness)
32Although as noted in the introduction, we remain agnostic as to whether the value of trade
supported was equal to the monopoly level (as advocated by Ogilvie 2011) or the `eﬃcient' level
(as advocated by Greif , Milgrom and Weingast (1994)).
33Gelderblom (2005) tells us, for example, that: "In 1243  ten years earlier than in Flanders
 merchants from Lübeck and Hamburg already received letters of safe-conduct from the Count of
Holland, who hoped they would use Dutch inland waterways to reach Bruges." See also Lopez et.
al. (2001).
34And Greif (2006) p. 92) tells us that `...the ruler could discriminate among merchants respecting
the rights of some but not others. Protection of rights was a private good rather than a public one,
as a ruler could respect the rights of some merchants but not others'.
35Gelderblom and Grafe describe this as the `power of exclusion' and consider it the highest
form of control, deﬁned by an ability to exclude non-members (and members who infringed on
their own rules) from a particular market.
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by including demands for compensation in merchants' strategies. The historical evi-
dence suggests that medieval merchants only attempted to enforce trade embargoes
on cities after they had refused to pay compensation to traders whose property
had not been protected. The resumption of trade also typically depended upon
merchants ﬁrst being indemniﬁed for past losses. Gelderblom (2005) tells us:
`Besides defense and deterrence, protection also implied the ability of
traders to get compensation if their person and goods are damaged. In
medieval Europe merchant guilds took to collective action, often with the
support of their home government, to claim damages from host rulers.
Soon enough host rulers set up a court system to allow local and foreign
traders to recoup losses from privateering, wrongful arrests, corruption,
and commercial disputes.'
Examples of successful demands for compensation, backed by the threat of embar-
goes, abound in the historical literature. In 1340, Tabriz's ruler conﬁscated the
goods of many Genoese traders, and Genoa responded by declaring a commercial
embargo (a devetum). In 1344, Tabriz's ruler sent ambassadors to Genoa promis-
ing to indemnify the traders for everything that had been taken from them. As
a consequence, the devetum was removed and Genoese traders ﬂocked to Iran.36
In 1407, the government of England was forced to negotiate compensation for the
losses of Hanseatic merchants in the hands of English pirates, to prevent a poten-
tially devastating trade embargo which would have `closed the continent to English
cloth' (Pedersen 2006, p. 169). The guilds' strategy of conditioning future trade on
receiving compensation for past violations is also reﬂected in the agreement made
in 1261 between Flemish merchants from Ghent, Ypres, Douai, Cambrai, and Dix-
mude who purchased English wool.37 And Kohn (2003, p. 36) observes that `by
the middle of the 13th century some maritime cities were imposing a tax on goods
moving through their ports to pay compensation to foreigners who might otherwise
have taken reprisals', and that, `Genoa established a Robbery Oﬃce to compensate
foreigners who had been robbed by a Genoese (usually at sea)'.
The German Hansa was particularly successful during the fourteenth and ﬁf-
36See Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994, pp. 755-756), Ogilvie (2011, p. 150).
37`For the good of the trade' they decided that `if it should happen that any cleric or any other
merchant anywhere in England who deals with sales of wool deals falsely with any merchant in this
alliance ... by giving false weight or false dressing of the wool or a false product ... and if they
do not wish to make amends, we have decided that no present or future member of this alliance
will be so bold as to trade with them'. To make their threat of a boycott functional, they `decided
that there will be in each of these cities one man to view and judge the grievances, and to persuade
the wrongdoers to make amends' (Moore 1985, p. 301; Greif, 2006, Ch. 4; Greif, Milgrom and
Weingast 1994, p. 756).
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teenth centuries in protecting the interests of German merchants in medieval trad-
ing centers, using the threat of embargoes to extract privileges and compensation
when merchants rights were violated. Table 1 below, taken from Gelderblom (2005,
p. 30), details payments made to German merchants from 1358-1498 by the city
of Bruges either for failure to protect Hansa merchants, or for the conﬁscation of
goods.38
Table 1 Compensation paid to German merchants in Bruges
Date Motivation Pounds Flem.
1360 Various complaints 4,111
1392 Conﬁscation of German goods 11,100
1397 Damage done in local hostel 107
1405 Attack by pirates from Nieuwpoort 703
1430 Damage done by local moneychanger 267
1431-2 Attack by pirates from Scotland 2151
1438 Murder of Germans in Sluis 8,000
1438 Attack of two German hostellers 108
1457 Various complaints 2,000
1498 Piracy & damages to Florentine merchant 18,000
Gelderblom (2005, p. 29-30) observes:
`The collective organization of merchants oﬀered another means to get
compensation for damages, and that was through collective action. If
host rulers highly valued the presence of foreign merchants their threat
to boycott trade or leave could secure the payment of damages. Notably
the German Hansa relied on this strategy between 1250 and 1500, though
it did not always come to a collective departure.'
The German Hansa's success at securing compensation hinged on its ability to coor-
dinate collective action, and it is not surprising that, as Gelderblom puts it, `it did
not always come to a collective departure' since an important purpose of demanding
compensation was presumably to avoid such an ineﬃcient outcome. Other exam-
ples of demands for compensation to avoid, or end, trade embargoes can be found
38See also Gelderblom (2013, p. 173). Dollinger (1970, pp 89-90) details a number of earlier
instances. He notes that Bruge's account books reveal three payments of damages to the German
Hansa: in 1357-1358 for 1,800 pounds ﬂemish; in 1359-1360, 1,547 pounds ﬂemish to two German
traders for an outstanding claim on the Bruges citizen Laureins van der Buerze, and for Scottish
merchandise that had been arrested on their behalf by the city of Bruges; and in 1360-1361, 5590
pounds ﬂemish as part of the damages awarded by Flanders to the Hansa.
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in Greif, Milgrom and Weingast and elsewhere.39
As we observed in the Introduction, the expectation of the payment of com-
pensation by cities is not the reason that individual merchants' incentives are more
closely aligned with those of the guild under the equilibrium strategies posited in
this paper. Most merchants would not have expected to receive any payment for
participating in trade embargoes, as compensation was only paid to those individ-
uals whose rights had been violated or goods robbed or conﬁscated. Rather, the
demand for compensation made it in the cities' interest to cheat embargo breakers
and resume trade with the guild at the ﬁrst opportunity whenever an embargo was
called. This made trading during embargoes unproﬁtable for individual merchants,
and hence participation in trade boycotts in their individual interest. As Greif,
Milgrom and Weingast (1994, p. 757) observed, `the credibility and force of a coor-
dinating organization's threat to impose an embargo crucially depended on curtailing
the ruler's ability to undermine an embargo by oﬀering special terms to violators'.
According to our theory, however, the mechanism used did not, strictly speaking,
curtail the cities' ability to trade with embargo breakers; rather, the opportunity to
pay compensation in return for ending an embargo made it in the cities' interests
not to do so.
This is an important issue because the ultimate sanction a guild could impose
on its members was expulsion, or exclusion, from the guild and its trading privi-
leges. This sanction was unlikely to have been eﬀective against embargo breaking,
however, and presumably for this reason was rarely, if ever, used for such purposes.
Ogilvie (2011, p.. 269-70), for example, argues that there is little or no evidence of
guilds eﬀectively using ostracism or exclusion  what she terms `peer pressure'  to
discipline their members:
`While some guild ordinances certainly threatened ostracism for any guild
member who violated guild rules, ... those cases that are recorded contain
intriguing indications of the limited eﬀectiveness of the peer pressure that
could be exercised by even the most powerful merchant guilds against
members. ...Empirically, we have little evidence that merchant guilds
did exercise successful peer pressure.' 40
39Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994, p. 756; p. 757; p. 760; p. 761). See also Postel (1996)
and Kohn (2003).
40Ogilvie (2011, p. 324) also observes that `Some merchant groupings did penalize deviant agents
... though how eﬀective these sanctions were is hard to gauge. The evidence ... is not all that one
would desire. It consists almost exclusively of formal rules and contracts, with little or no evidence
of practical implementation. Postan and Dollinger rely wholly on charters and ordinances, which
show that medieval merchant guilds and the German Hanse formulated regulations to try to control
agency problems. But these scholars do not provide evidence of how  if at all  these rules were
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Sachs' (2006) extensive study of the surviving court rolls of the fair of St. Ives
between 1270 and 1324 ﬁnds no evidence of `the threat of ostracism by the merchant
community at large' to discipline cheats or debtors, nor any evidence of their use by
merchant guilds.41 Sachs (2006, pp. 707-708) mentions two factors which caution
against viewing the threat of ostracism as a signiﬁcant mechanism of enforcement.
First, it is not clear how eﬀective or credible such threats were, and second, they
were `a blunt instrument which could be far more costly to their organizers than to
those whom they targeted'.
The often-cited case of the German Hansa is of particular interest in this regard.
While Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994, pp. 758-762) attribute much of the
success of the German Hansa to its increased ability, after 1307, to enforce trade
boycotts by making use of the threat of exclusion, the historical evidence does not
directly support their thesis.42 Although the Hansa used the economic weapon of the
trade embargo successfully and repeatedly from the thirteenth to ﬁfteenth centuries
against numerous countries, including Poland, Russia, Norway, England, Scotland,
Flanders, France, Castile and Venice,43 it is clear from Dollinger's account that
German towns only participated in these when self-interest dictated and the threat
of sanctions and exclusion, although present, was almost never used. The unique
case of the expulsion of Bremen in 1284 for its refusal to participate in a trade
embargo against Norway  described in Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994, p. 760)
as a `milestone' in Hansa organization  illustrated the limited power of this threat.
Bremen's merchants traded successfully outside of the Hansa for the subsequent 74
years, relying on their long-standing trade connections with Scandinavia, Flanders
and England and the special privileges accorded to them there,44 and did not apply
for readmission to the Hansa until 1358. As this is the only instance of a German
town being expelled from the Hansa for refusing to participate in a blockade,45 it
is far from clear that it marked the point where the sanction of exclusion became a
viable or eﬀective weapon in enforcing trade embargoes.
Indeed, the ineﬀectiveness of the expulsion of Bremen in 1284 meant that this
penalty was deliberately not invoked in 1388 against the Prussian towns when they
enforced'.
41See also Ogilvie (2011, p. 269-70).
42In the appendix we describe the history of Hansa trade embargoes in more detail.
43See Ogilvie (2011, pp. 148-152) and Dollinger (1970, p. 110). See Gelderblom (2005, Annex 2)
for a detailed account of the various commercial disputes between the Hansa and Bruges between
1250 and 1500.
44Dollinger (1970, p. 66-67).
45Towns were occasionally subject to temporary exclusion from the Hansa over other issues,
such as Brunswick (1375), Bremen (1427, 1563) and Cologne (1471). See Dollinger (1970, p. 108,
p.336).
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refused to participate in an embargo against Flanders,46 and these events were re-
peated in the subsequent centuries. In 1438, a blockade against the Low Countries
failed to gain the support of the Prussian towns, forcing the Wendish Hansa towns
to capitulate by signing the Treaty of Copenhagen in 1441 (Dollinger, p. 300). In
1451, an attempt to move the Kontor from Bruges to Dewenter was also thwarted
by the Prussian towns who did not approve of the move, joined by Cologne which
openly deﬁed the embargo and continued to trade wine with Flanders in deﬁance
of Hansa staple regulations. The Hansa backed down and modiﬁed the blockade to
apply to Flanders and Flemish cloth only, meaning that `the blockade's chances of
success were seriously reduced ' (Dollinger 1970, p. 301). Dollinger (1970, p. 111)
notes that the Prussian and Wendish towns participated, or not, in embargoes in
the 14th and 15th centuries, `showing varying degrees of enthusiasm' and Hansa dis-
unity over the implementation of trade embargoes facilitated Dutch advances into
Eastern Europe (p. 195).
Dollinger (1970, pp. 108-109) also tells us that `exclusion, of course, could be
used against individuals ' for transgressing `the law of the common merchant ', but
that it was a `two-edged weapon' since excluded merchants could carry on trading
outside of the guild, at the expense of guild members. Only a single instance of the
Hansa expelling an individual merchant, in this case for bypassing Hansa regulations
on the payment of excise duties in England, is cited by Dollinger, the same example
cited by Ogilvie (2011, p. 127). The merchant in question, one Christian Kolmer,
quickly obtained English nationality, continued trading and subsequently took every
opportunity to `make trouble for his former compatriots '.47
If the threat of expulsion or exclusion was not a credible or eﬀective means of en-
forcing trade embargoes, the guilds needed another mechanism to make coordinated,
or multilateral, punishment of cities self-enforcing. According to the historical ev-
idence, the mechanism they used was to demand compensation when merchants'
rights were violated, thus making it proﬁtable for cities to cheat embargo breakers,
and hence making participation in embargoes self-enforcing for individual merchants.
46Dollinger (1970, p. 76). The Prussian towns were granted special concessions and continued
trading in Flanders throughout the embargo.
47Ogilvie (2011, pp. 262-63) also relates a case of exclusion reported in De Roover (1948, p.
172), although again it did not concern a trade embargo. `In 1350, the Cologne merchant Tideman
Bloumeroot sued the elders of the German Hanse in the local Bruges town court, thereby violating
Hanse regulations claiming exclusive jurisdiction over disputes among Hanse members in Bruges.
As a result, Bloumeroot was expelled from the Hanse and deprived of guild privileges. Henceforth,
no Hanseatic merchant was permitted to enter into a partnership with him nor to ship goods in the
same vessel.'
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VI. What Level Of Trade?
In the preceding sections we have shown that by demanding compensation when
their rights were violated, and only ending trade embargoes once compensation had
been paid, the guilds would have been able to resolve the enforcement problem,
making trade embargoes (or multilateral punishments) self-enforcing. They would
thus have been able to support trade at higher levels than otherwise. A question so
far neglected, however, is whether the merchants and the cities would have agreed
on the level of trade which they wished to support. We address this issue in this
section.
We have already seen that the city would prefer a level of trade mC , exceeding
that which can be supported by bilateral punishment strategies, but nevertheless
falling below the eﬃcient level, i.e. m̂ < mC < m∗. But what level of trade mG
would the guild prefer? Would it wish to control entry so as to maximize the total
value of trade to its members, v (m) − τ (m)? Or would it want to further limit
trade to increase the payoﬀ of individual guild members, 1
m
(v (m)− τ (m))?
Certainly individual merchants within a guild would have had strong incentives
to restrict further membership so as to limit trade and increase their own proﬁts.
There is some historical evidence in favor of this view. Lane (1973), for example,
tells us that the `frankly avowed purpose' of the guild of the merchant nobles of
Venice was `to help Venetian merchants make proﬁts'. And Postel (1996) notes that
`from the middle of the 14th century ... the Hanseatic meetings had to decide on
formal applications; their decision depended on whether admission was advantageous
to the Hansa or not'. Writing on merchant associations in pre-industrial Europe,
Kohn (2003) summarizes the evidence as follows:
`Some guilds, especially earlier on, were very loosely deﬁned and included
all sorts of merchants, tradesmen, and artisans... Later, guilds became
more exclusive, with membership limited to merchants alone or even to
particular categories of merchant trading in particular types of merchan-
dise or to particular destinations. At the same time, it became more
diﬃcult to join a guild, with membership generally descending from fa-
ther to eldest son, and outsiders having to purchase entry at considerable
cost. The reason for the greater exclusiveness was that over time many
guilds acquired valuable rights  monopolies over particular forms of
trade or exemptions from various tolls and taxes. Naturally the members
wished to keep these hard-won beneﬁts to themselves.'
A guild that wished to maximize the payoﬀ of individual guild members would
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attempt to restrict trade to the level that maximizes 1
m
(v (m)− τ (m)), so that mG
is given by the condition
v′
(
mG
)− τ ′ (mG) = 1
mG
(
v
(
mG
)− τ (mG)) . (0.22)
If mG > m̂, the guild could enforce the level mG by aﬀording protection to only
mG traders. If mG < m̂, since v − τ is increasing the best the guild can do would
be to limit the number of traders entering a city to m̂, since trade below this level
would provide the city with an incentive to elicit trade from non-guild members
(cf. the argument underlying Proposition 3 above). In either case, a guild with the
power to control its membership would want to impose an ineﬃcient level of trade
from the city's point of view, since mG 6= mC almost surely. This may be seen as
providing some support for the arguments of Ogilvie (2011), for instance, as it is no
longer clear that the levels of trade supported by guilds would be superior to the
levels that would arise in their absence.
One possibility is that the guilds could enter into exclusive trade arrangements
with cities in order to control the overall level of trade. From the historical evidence
referred to above, acquiring such exclusive trading privileges was evidently a common
aim of the medieval merchant guilds.48 This could in theory result in even lower
levels of trade being supported (e.g. at mG < m̂, ), by the city agreeing not to trade
with non-guild members. Since the city rulers would still prefer trade up to mC ,
compensation of some kind would presumably have been required to obtain their
agreement, either in the form of a higher tax rate or a lump-sum transfer. But this
is ruled out in the current model since any reduction in trade below m̂ results in a
lower net value of trade. Thus compensating the city to implement such a reduction
would not be possible.
An alternative would be for the guild to agree on an expansion of trade beyond
the level which could be supported by bilateral punishment strategies (i.e. m̂ < m ≤
m∗), in return for favorable tax treatment from the city. This may be more consistent
with the historical evidence concerning the trading privileges acquired by guilds, and
also accords with the Greif, Milgrom and Weingast thesis that the establishment of
guilds led to trade expansion. Indeed, as Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994, p.
749) argue:
`If the purpose of the guilds was to create monopoly power for the mer-
chants and to increase their bargaining power with the rulers, why did
powerful rulers during the late medieval period cooperate with alien mer-
48As Ogilvie (2011, Ch. 6) puts it, a `universal shared purpose of merchant guilds was to get
monopoly privileges for their members'. See also Dollinger (1970, p. 187).
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chants to establish guilds in the ﬁrst place? What oﬀsetting advantages
did the rulers enjoy? The puzzle is resolved if the guild's power enabled
trade to expand to the beneﬁt of the merchants and rulers alike.'
As we have pointed out above, however, a guild whose role was merely to coordinate
merchant responses to cheating would not have been in a position to negotiate trade
expansion and tax privileges with medieval city rulers. For this, the guilds needed
to be able to control the number of merchants trading with a city. Analyzing the
bargaining game between cities and guilds over tax privileges and exclusive levels of
trade takes us beyond the scope of the current paper.49
VII. Conclusion
The role played by the merchant guilds in the development of European trade and
commerce from the 10th to the 18th centuries is still widely debated. While numer-
ous authors have argued that they facilitated economic growth and trade expansion
by resolving problems of commercial security, contract enforcement and principal
agent problems (e.g. Gelderblom and Grafe, 2010; Gelderblom, 2010; Greif, Mil-
grom and Weingast, 1994; Ewert and Selzer, 2005, Hicks and Thompson, 1991),
Ogilvie (2011) has forcefully reasserted the more `traditionalist' view of the guilds
as ineﬃcient monopoly institutions supported by powerful economic and political
elites who operated at the expense of society as a whole. All authors agree that
the guilds wielded considerable economic power, however, particularly through the
use of trade embargoes against medieval towns, and that this power relied upon
the guilds' ability to enforce participation in trade embargoes by individual mer-
chants (or towns) via the threat of exclusion or expulsion. In the much-cited Greif,
Milgrom and Weingast (1994) analysis, the guilds evolved as institutions capable
of supporting eﬃcient trade between alien merchants and medieval city-states, but
this depended entirely upon the guilds' ability to coordinate merchant responses to
cheating by enforcing compliance to trade boycotts by individual traders. Credible
incentives for embargo breaking would otherwise have rendered the guilds ineﬀec-
tual.
49Such an analysis would need to specify what the city and the guild were bargaining over
(e.g. levels of trade, tax rates, lump-sum transfers or compensation), and the parties' `inside' and
`outside' options (see Muthoo 1999 for the deﬁnitions of these terms). For instance, would the city
continue to beneﬁt from trade at level m̂ while bargaining was taking place (making it an `inside'
option)? Would this trade occur with potential guild members, or with `outsiders'? And so on.
Dessi and Ogilvie (2004) consider a game in which the guild makes lump-sum transfers to city rulers
in exchange for exclusive trading privileges. They assume that the city makes take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀers to the guild however, which simpliﬁes the bargaining problem.
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As we have demonstrated in this paper, once the guilds' demands for compen-
sation are taken into account, no such internal enforcement mechanism would have
been necessary. Our formulation of the guilds' equilibrium strategies, based on
our review of the historical evidence, makes the threat to impose a trade boycott
self-enforcing, and resolves the enforcement problem noted by Greif, Milgrom and
Weingast (1994). The guilds did not need the power to coerce individual merchants
into taking part in the punishment of cities in order to support eﬃcient trade, since
they could rely on traders' private equilibrium incentives to do so.
By demanding compensation when their rights were violated (and only ending
trade embargoes once compensation had been paid), the guilds would thus have been
able to solve the enforcement problem and support trade at higher levels than would
have otherwise occurred. The guilds did not need the power to coerce individual
merchants into taking part in the punishment of cities in order to support eﬃcient
trade, since they could rely on traders' private equilibrium incentives to do so.
Implementing particular levels of trade would have required that guilds did more
than merely coordinate merchant responses to cheating, however. In the absence of
any ability to control the number of merchants trading with a city, the incentives
of individual traders could easily have led to volumes of trade well above the levels
desired by either cities or guilds. An ability to control their own membership (and
to only punish cities when they violated the rights of guild members), gave the
guilds the power to restrict the equilibrium level of trade. A guild which aimed to
maximize the average proﬁts of its members might then have wished to implement
a sub-optimal level of trade from the city's point of view. But the same ability to
restrict trade could also have been used to negotiate favorable treatment for guild
members, in return for an agreement to expand trade towards the levels desired by
cities. This may provide some support for the Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994)
thesis that the establishment of the merchant guilds led to trade expansion in the
late middle ages.
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Appendix: The German Hansa
The German Hansa (or `Hanseatic League', as it was known in England), which
originated with the founding of Lubeck in 1159 and persisted roughly from the mid-
dle of the twelfth century until the middle of the seventeenth century (Weiner 1932;
Dollinger 1970; Lloyd 1991), provides perhaps the best example of the phenomena
of interest to our analysis . Originally an association of traveling merchants open
to all German merchants who traded overseas (Lloyd, 1991, p. 2), by the middle of
the ﬁfteenth century it had become a loose federation of some 200 towns from the
northern Low Countries (towns like Deventer and Zwolle) in the west, via the North
Sea and Baltic shores to today's Finland in the east. Its character as an associa-
tion, or alliance, of mercantile interests remained unchanged, however, and it lacked
a centralized governing structure (Dollinger 1970; Stabel 2004). It created trade
settlements, the so-called kontore, in Bruges, London, Novgorod and Bergen (Nor-
way), and it was present in the major markets of medieval Europe. In the twelfth
century, German merchants actively traded all over the Baltic and participated in
the founding of towns dedicated to trade. By the middle of the thirteenth century
they held a near-monopoly of trade around the Baltic and North Seas, and their
commerce was organized around the axis of Novogorod-Lubeck-Hamburg-Bruges-
London (Dollinger, 1970, p. xviii). By the fourteenth century they had expanded
their activities to southern Germany and Italy by land, and France, Spain and Por-
tugal by sea. Dollinger (1970) dates the dissolution of the Hansa as 1630 when a
closer alliance of Lubeck, Bremen and Hamburg took its place.
The remainder of this appendix documents the history of Hansa trade embargoes
and shows that exclusion as a punishment for embargo breaking was rarely used,
and was probably ineﬀective in this regard.
In the last quarter of the 13th century the Hansa began to actively intervene
abroad to protect the trading privileges of its merchants. Its chosen weapon, ac-
cording to Dollinger (1970, p. 47), was the blockade or suspension of all trade. In
1252, a Kontor of German merchants had obtained extensive trading privileges in
Bruges, and a permanent settlement followed (Weiner 1932, p. 218).50 The trad-
ing privileges given to the foreign merchants led to mounting discontent in Bruges,
eventually causing riots (Dollinger 1970, p. 48). A document dated 1280 reported
that `it is unfortunately only too well known that merchants traveling in Flanders
have been the objects of all kinds of maltreatment in the town of Bruges and have
50The Kontor was led by six aldermen elected by the German merchants present in the town.
Two of the aldermen were from Rhenish towns, two from Westphalian-Wendish towns, and two
from Prussian-Baltic towns, reﬂecting the range of origins of the participating German merchants
(De Roover 1965, p. 114; Dollinger 1970, p. 86).
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not been able to protect themselves from this' (Urkundenbuch der Stadt Lubeck, I,
no. 156, p. 371, translated by Dollinger, 1970, p. 383). Together with most of
the other foreign traders who operated in Bruges, the German merchants retaliated
in 1280 by transferring their trade to Aardenburg. After two years of negotiation,
a new agreement was reached in which the Hansa not only reaﬃrmed their former
privileges but obtained new concessions regarding weights and measures and the
right to trade directly with other foreigner merchants, and the Kontor returned to
Bruges. As Dollinger (1970, p. 49) observes, `the economic weapon in the form of
the transfer of the Kantor had shown itself to be very eﬀective'.
In 1284, following the success of its embargo against Bruges, the Hansa imposed
a blockade on Norway where local discontent with its trading privileges had resulted
in an attack on a German ship. Export of grain, ﬂour, vegetables and beer to Norway
were prohibited. In this case however, the city of Bremen refused to cooperate in the
embargo, and the other German towns retaliated by excluding Bremen's merchants
from all Hanseatic trading privileges. Although according to Greif, Milgrom and
Weingast (1994, p. 760; also Greif 2006, Ch. 4) this marked a `milestone' in Hansa
organization in that `the German towns had achieved the coordination needed to expel
one of their members', Dollinger (1970, p. 66-67) notes that Bremen's merchants
did not apply for readmission to the Hansa until 74 years later in 1358. This was
because the merchants of Bremen could rely on their own long-standing connections
with Scandinavia, Flanders and England and the special privileges accorded to them
there. Hence they saw no point in rejoining the Hansa. As this is the only instance
of a German town being expelled from the Hansa for refusing to participate in
a blockade,51 it is far from clear that it marked the point where the sanction of
exclusion became a viable or eﬀective weapon in enforcing trade embargoes, as
argued by Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994).
In 1307, the Hansa once again moved its Kontor from Bruges to Aardenburg
where it remained until 1309. Only the German towns participated in this embargo,
and its aim was to force Bruges to respect the agreements with the Hansa reached
in 1280. As a result of a new agreement to respect German traders' privileges,
Dollinger (1970, p. 51) argues that Flanders' trade ﬂourished for the next 50 years.
The Hansa's relations with Bruges deteriorated again around 1350, however,
mainly because Bruges was not ready to compensate the Germans for their damages
51According to Dollinger (1970, p. 90), in most other instances towns were excluded temporarily
due to civil disorders and revolutions. An exception was Cologne, which was expelled in 1471 for
obtaining special trading privileges with England (see also Pederson, 2006). Bremen was brieﬂy
expelled again during 1427-1432 over a political dispute with the Hansa (Dollinger 1970, p. 290)
and in 1563 for adopting Calvinism (Dollinger 1970, p. 336).
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in Flanders from the war between England and France.52 A Hanseatic embargo of
Bruges and the whole of Flanders followed in 1358. According to Dollinger (1970,
p. 65) `any disobedience, whether by a town or an individual, was to be punished by
perpetual exclusion from the Hansa'. Bruges attempted to defeat the embargo by
oﬀering trading privileges to individual cities, including both non-Hanseatic ones,
such as Kampen, and a Hanseatic one, Cologne. While the non-Hanseatic cities
accepted Bruges' terms, Cologne refused to cooperate. The embargo proved a success
and, in 1360, Bruges came to terms with the Hansa, including agreement on the
provision of indemnities of 1,800 pounds ﬂemish (see above).
Despite the consolidation of the Hansa organization, and the success of its latest
embargo, the situation remained `precarious' (Dollinger, p. 67) and the Hanseatics
were `condemned to a perpetual struggle in order to maintain their privileged sta-
tus'. Conﬂict with Denmark followed (1367-1370) and embargoes against England,
Flanders and Russia in 1388 (Dollinger, p. 72). In 1377-78, the Kontor instructed
German merchants to leave Bruges, following numerous complaints of violations of
privileges. Upon learning of this, the Bruges authorities arrested German merchants
and conﬁscated their goods, resulting in a humiliating climb-down by the Kontor.
Subsequent protracted negotiations by the Hanseatic Diet for compensation came
to nothing (Dollinger 1970, p. 75), and a new embargo was decreed in 1388. This
time, however, the Hansa's internal divisions led to non participation in the block-
ade by the Teutonic Order and the Prussian towns who had no direct stake in the
dispute (p. 76). They were subsequently granted special concessions to continue
trading.53 Four years of negotiations ensued in which the now weakened Hansa
abandoned many of its original demands. They did, however, obtain compensation
for the events of 1378 equal to 11,100 Flemish pounds (see Table 1 above). But di-
visions within the Hansa, and strains that embargoes placed on Hanseatic solidarity
(Dollinger 1970, p. 111), meant that 1388 marked `the last great Hanseatic victory
in the Low Countries' (Dollinger 1970, p. 77).
Although the Hansa used the economic weapon of the trade embargo successfully
and repeatedly from the thirteenth to ﬁfteenth centuries against numerous countries,
including Poland, Russia, Norway, England, Scotland, Flanders, France, Castile and
Venice,54 it is clear from Dollinger's account that German towns only participated in
52According to Greif (2006, Ch. 4, p. 107), the Hansa responded by strengthening its internal
organization. In 1356, the Hansa held its ﬁrst Diet, which determined that the Kontor of Bruges,
hitherto independent, should be subordinate to the Diet's decisions. The German towns, via
the Diet, were imposing their authority over merchants in foreign cities. This authority was
subsequently extended to Novgorod, Bergen, and London (Dollinger 1970, pp. 62-64).
53Non-Hansa towns such as Kampen also refused to respect the embargo.
54Dollinger (1970, p. 110). See Gelderblom (2005, Annex 2) for a detailed account of the various
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these when self-interest dictated and the threat of sanctions and exclusion, although
present, was almost never used. The unique case of the expulsion of Bremen in
1284 illustrated the limited power of this threat. Bremen rationally chose not to
participate in a blockade it deemed to be against its own economic interests, and
was able to continue trading proﬁtably outside of the Hansa for the following 74
years.
While Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994, pp. 758-762) attribute much of the
success of the German Hansa to its increased ability, after 1284, to enforce trade
boycotts by making use of the threat of exclusion, the historical evidence does not
really support this thesis. Hansa embargoes prior to the expulsion of Bremen in 1284
seemed to have been at least as eﬀective as subsequent embargoes, and their success
seemed to depend more on the economic interests of individual Hansa towns to
participate than upon any threatened punishments. Indeed, the expulsion of Bremen
was evidently ineﬀective in 1284, and this penalty was deliberately not invoked in
1388 against the Prussian towns when they refused to participate in the embargo
against Bruges. These events were repeated in the subsequent centuries. In 1438, a
blockade against the Low Countries failed to gain the support of the Prussian towns,
forcing the Wendish Hansa towns to capitulate by signing the Treaty of Copenhagen
in 1441 (Dollinger, p. 300). In 1451, an attempt to move the Kontor from Bruges
to Dewenter was also thwarted by the Prussian towns who did not approve of the
move, joined by Cologne which openly deﬁed the embargo and continued to trade
wine with Flanders in deﬁance of Hansa staple regulations. The Hansa, led from
Lubeck, backed down and modiﬁed the blockade to apply to Flanders and Flemish
cloth only, meaning that `the blockade's chances of success were seriously reduced'
(Dollinger, 1970, p. 301).
Dollinger (1970, pp. 108-109) points out that `exclusion, of course, could be
used against individuals' for transgressing `the law of the common merchant', but
notes that it was a `two-edged weapon' since excluded merchants could carry on
trading outside of the guild, at the expense of guild members. Dollinger cites only
a single instance of the German Hansa expelling a member merchant, in this case
for bypassing Hansa regulations on the payment of excise duties in England. The
merchant in question quickly obtained English nationality, continued trading and
subsequently took every opportunity to `make trouble for his former compatriots'.
Ogilvie (2011, pp. 262-63) also relates a case of exclusion reported in De Roover
(1948, p. 172), although again it did not concern a trade embargo.55
commercial disputes between the Hansa and Bruges between 1250 and 1500.
55`In 1350, the Cologne merchant Tideman Bloumeroot sued the elders of the German Hanse
in the local Bruges town court, thereby violating Hanse regulations claiming exclusive jurisdiction
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Pederson (2006) on the Hansa Embargo of England in 1435:
`In May, 1435, Henry VI sent a delegation to Bruges where the Hanseatic
delegation  which by now was reduced to two members: the mayors of
Danzig and Hamburg, Heinrich Vorrath and Heinrich Hoyer  had set up
permanent quarters. But since the English delegation wanted to negotiate
the position of the English in Hanseatic areas as well as the Hanseatic
charters in England, and since the Hanseatic delegation had no authority
to treat these matters, negotiations were broken oﬀ pending consultations
between the delegation and the Hanseatic diet.
The Hanseatic diet decided on a hard line in the confrontation with the
English. Danzig refused to negotiate about the position of the English and
the diet decided to implement the strongest weapon short of war against
the English merchants. The Steelyard was closed and its members moved
to Bruges, and an oﬃcial trade embargo was initiated. But a trade em-
bargo was diﬃcult to enforce and aﬀorded an entrance for middlemen,
a situation which was more likely to harm the Hanseatic position on the
continental markets than the loss of their privileges in England. The em-
bargo was also not very eﬃcient among the Hanseatic towns themselves:
Cologne ignored the decision of the diet and even contemplated a sepa-
rate treaty with the English, the Zuider Zee towns who had always been
the unruly corner of the Hanse also ignored the embargo, and even the
grand master of the order of the Teutonic Knights authorised the entry
into his area of six large English ships to trade there in April, 143684.
Accepting defeat, Danzig furnished the delegation in Bruges with a set of
more moderate claims in July,
1436, but they still refused to authorise Vorrath and Hoyer to negotiate
the position of the English in Prussia. Vorrath, who knew that it was
impossible to reach an agreement with the English unless the Prussian
problem was solved and that the Hanseatic unity would soon break un-
less an agreement was reached, resolved to take the matter into his own
hands. He admitted that the issue should be dealt with and assumed the
responsibility for the consequences of a transgression of his mandate. He
oﬀered to negotiate the English position in Prussia.'
over disputes among Hanse members in Bruges. As a result, Bloumeroot was expelled from the
Hanse and deprived of guild privileges: Henceforth, no Hanseatic merchant was permitted to enter
into a partnership with him nor to ship goods in the same vessel.'
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